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Abstract 
This report aims at summarizing the on-going research activity carried out by DG-JRC in 
the framework of the institutional project Authors and Victims Identification of Child Abuse 
on-line, concerning the use of microphone fingerprinting for source device classification. 
Starting from an exhaustive study of the State of Art regarding the matter, this report 
describes a feasibility study about the adoption of microphone fingerprinting for source 
identification of video recordings. A set of operational scenarios have been established in 
collaboration with EUROPOL law enforcers, according to investigators needs. A critical 
analysis of the obtained results has demonstrated the feasibility of microphone 
fingerprinting and it has suggested a set of recommendations, both in terms of usability 
and future researches in the field.    
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose 
This document presents the first steps of a study carried out within JRC research activity 
on source device identification techniques using microphone fingerprint, as a possible 
support to strengthen European Law Enforcement bodies’ capabilities to fight against Child 
Abuse on-line. This activity has been conducted in the framework of the institutional project 
Authors and Victims Identification of Child Abuse On-line (560-AVICAO), started in 2014, 
and it has been accomplished in close and fruitful cooperation with EUROPOL’s European 
Cyber-Crime Centre (EC3). 
Briefly, as already shown and discussed in previous JRC activities [1][2], camera 
fingerprinting techniques allows to associate multimedia contents as pictures and/or video 
recordings to its source camera, namely the device that was used to capture them. From 
law enforcers’ point of view, the capability to recognize the source camera can enable 
linking across files coming from different cases or attributing untrusted unlawful material 
to its potential authors, and lead to an enhanced capability to identify perpetrators and 
victims of such crimes. 
During the previous activities carried out by JRC staff within the AVICAO project [1], Sensor 
Pattern Noise (SPN) was proved to be an effective tool for source camera identification 
from images and video recordings, despite some limitations about its usability. In 
particular, source identification from video recordings is still a challenging problem, due to 
the fact that videos have generally a resolution smaller than that of images, and the 
compression factor is usually higher, making SPN feature extraction and matching less 
reliable. Moreover, the majority of SPN-based methods suffers a scarce capability of scaling 
when large amount of data has to be analysed, classified or clustered. Nonetheless, the 
presence of audio track in a video recording provides a second potential source of 
information about the device, namely, the traces that microphone leaves in the audio. As 
well as for SPN, where the manufacturing process produces a non-uniform light response 
of each pixel, also for microphone the variable tolerances of each electric component make 
microphones respond to the sound in a different and, hopefully, unique way. 
After this brief foreword, this deliverable of the AVICAO project is pursuing the following 
goals: 
 To select a microphone fingerprinting technique, out of the ones present in the
scientific literature, suitable for source device identification from video recordings,
that can be complementary to the Sensor Pattern Noise and, last but not least, that
exhibits a level of maturity compatible with the requirements of law enforcers;
 To define a set of operational scenarios in which the chosen method would be
validated by EC3 investigators;
 To study the feasibility of the method and, in positive case, to develop a prototype
tool for law enforcers;
 To draw up conclusions and provide recommendations for further research activities
and practical usage of microphone fingerprinting.
The potentialities of the selected method are explored in different operational scenarios, 
according to the EC3 requirements. The scenarios are: 
 Device verification: Verify whether a given recording is taken with a given device
(1-to-1 comparison).
 Device classification/identification: assign a given video to the device that was
used to acquire it, in a close set of N known cameras (1-to-N comparison).
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 Content-based retrieval: retrieve all the video recordings taken with a given
recording.
 Clustering: cluster an unclassified set of video recordings into groups of recording
acquired with the same device.
For all the aforementioned scenarios, the experimental evaluation is carried out using a 
set of smartphones. This particular setting was chosen for the following motivations: 
 Smartphones are continuously spreading in present society, and a climbing
percentage of video contents are taken by means of such devices;
 Smartphones are the preferred way to produce video recording to be shared on-
line.
1.2 State of art 
Over the last years, the main approach followed by researchers for camera fingerprinting 
has been based on Sensor Pattern Noise. SPN is a noise that the camera sensor left within 
a multimedia content, either images or videos, due to the small differences in pixel light 
response. Since such uneven responses are due to the manufacturing process, they are 
unique and unrepeatable, so that they can be used as unique footprint to characterize a 
given source device. A great bibliography [3] and recent studies carried out by DG-JRC 
have shown promising result in the field in case of still images [1], whereas in case of video 
sequences, the performance is far from to be satisfying for an employment in real 
investigative workflow. This open issue is due to the fact that video frames are mainly 
provided in a strongly compressed format and some other processing might occur, as frame 
scaling and video stabilization, which affect the reliability of SPN extraction.  
Although this limitation seems still to be challenging in case of video recordings, a second 
information source is present within videos, namely the audio trace. From a different 
perspective, in order to generate a video sequence two different sensors are employed: 
the camera and the microphone. Similar to the strategy developed for camera in order to 
recognize the source device of a multimedia content, the microphone can be used for the 
same purpose. But, despite a vast variety of literature concerning automatic speech [4] 
and speaker [5] recognition has been produced so far, source microphone recognition 
seems to be still at its initial stage.  
From brand/model classification 
Over the last decade, a series of attempts to recognize the source of audio recordings have 
been made, for both landline and mobile phones. The pioneering work in the field is [6], 
wherein the authors proposed a set of audio steganalysis-based features to cluster (K-
means) or to predict (Naïve Bayes classifiers) both the microphone and the environment. 
The work has been extended in [7], wherein a first proof of concept concerning the usage 
of information fusion in microphone classification has been proposed, showing that 
combining statistical features (by means of supervised classification) and unweighted 
information fusion (at match, rank, and/or decision level) favourably affects classification 
results.  
Then, the same authors defined a context model for Microphone Forensics in a following 
work [8], which raised a set of points that are useful to be mentioned here. First, 
supervised classifier can reach 82.5% percent of accuracy, whereas unsupervised 
clustering method didn’t show significant results. Then, all the considered features 
(especially second derivatives of Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients, MFCCs) in the time, 
frequency and MFCC domains show good performance, even though Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) shows that just 1/3 of the features are responsible of the 95% of sample 
variance. Interestingly, results show that the performance is quite independent from the 
microphone orientation, whereas the mounting strongly affects the results, because of its 
correlation with vibrations (due to the type of mounting) and environment reverberation. 
6 
Moreover, aging (at one-year distance it has been tested) seems to have no effect on the 
overall accuracy. 
In the meantime, in [9] authors tried to automatically identify the acquisition device (using 
two data sets of landline telephone handsets and professional microphones) from speech 
recordings. MFCCs and Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (LFCCs) have been used to 
train Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) – Universal Background Model (UBM) and, at the 
end, to classify the acquisition device by means of Gaussian super-vectors and a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM). The method shows a high closed-set classification accuracy, 
exceeding 90% for model/brand classification, and suggest that MFCCs, as well as 
Gaussian super-vectors, are good candidates to model the microphone response. A similar 
approach has been presented in [10], wherein GMM-UBM models are employed as 
classifier, by maximizing a likelihood ratio function and stacking MFCCs with Power-
Normalized Cepstral Coefficients (PNCCs), reaching a model/brand classification accuracy 
of more than 97% on a limited set of 14 device models.  
Another work based on MFCC and SVM classifiers for closed-set classification of brand and 
models of cell-phones was presented in [11]. Differently from the previous one, also Vector 
Quantization (VQ) is employed for classification, in order to compare the performance of 
the two classification strategies. Both methods are able to reach a level of accuracy higher 
than 92% for brand/model identification.  
The aforementioned works use mainly speech as carrier signal to estimate how microphone 
impacts on the input signal. Other works used MFCCs of speech signals together with GMMs 
and the likelihood probability they provide [12] or to train a Radial Basis Function neural 
network classifier [13]. Both papers show a level of accuracy in closed-set classification 
higher than 90%, but in the former LPCCs outperform MFCCs. Kotropoulos and al.’s work 
[13] has been extended in [14] using sparse representation of spectral features sketches 
[15], wherein sparse spectral features are claimed to outperform MFCCs based approach. 
A further work based on sparse representation has been presented in [16] and [17], where 
authors employed Gaussian supervectors based on MFCCs that are extracted from speech 
recordings. For the sparse representation, both exemplar-based dictionary and K-SVD 
algorithm [18] have been employed for cell phone verification. 
To device level identification 
A limitation of the mentioned works is that most of them don’t assess the capabilities of 
their respective methods to deal with classification of cell-phone in case of several devices 
(either microphones or cell phones) of the same brand/model. Fortunately, in [19] it has 
been shown that microphone and loudspeakers fingerprinting is possible at device level by 
means of audio features and supervised machine learning techniques, such as k-Neural 
Network (k-NN) and GMMs. Also in this last work, among the analysed features, MFCCs 
are the best choice for microphone characterization. 
Beside speech-based microphone fingerprinting techniques, another research line explored 
the possibility of microphone fingerprinting by using no speech signals. In [20] Power 
Spectral Density (PSD) of speech-free audio recordings is used to train an SVM classifier 
for cell-phone microphone identification, whereas in [21] again MFCCs and LFCCs are 
employed in combination with SVM and GMMs (using likelihood ratios or mutual information 
criteria) to classify the source device. Although the method shows promising results, it 
seems to be extremely sensible to additive noise.  A similar approach is proposed in [22], 
wherein MFCCs entropy is explored together with several techniques of supervised and 
unsupervised Machine Learning techniques. Despite some quite outstanding results, the 
experimental evaluation protocol still remains limited and at laboratory level. Other 
methods based on MFCCs of non-speech signal and noise estimate are presented in [23] 
and [24], without introducing any significant improvement compared to the state-of-art. 
The works cited before extract microphone descriptive features, following a classic pattern 
recognition approach, without modelling a specific physical behaviour of microphone and/or 
audio propagation. Moreover, such features are classified only by means of supervised 
Machine Learning techniques, making their performance strongly dependent from the train 
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process and from the training data sets used. From another perspective, this lack of 
physical modelling makes the generalization to unsupervised problem, such as content-
based retrieval and clustering, a tough challenge and it represents a limitation in our study.  
To overcome these limitations, in [25], and then refined in following works [26][27], 
authors present methods for audio tampering detection and/or microphone classification 
based on blind channel estimation [28][29], wherein the feature they proposed is 
essentially derived by an estimate of the frequency response of microphone, which, in 
principle, can uniquely fingerprinting a microphone. Moreover, this feature appears suitable 
to be employed in unsupervised problems. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, no 
evidence concerning the capability of identifying a single device instead of a class of device 
of the same manufacturer/model, is present in these works. Furthermore, the authors of 
[25] and [28] claim two apparently conflicting conclusions: whereas the first ones assume 
that the channel that shapes the signal is essentially the microphone response, for the 
second the channel is meant as the audio environment. However, it is worth to note that 
if the method in [25] has been tested on real recordings, the second one has been tested 
on synthetic data only.  
The first conclusion of such works is that the traces left by the microphone within the 
recorded signal are detectable in the frequency domain [30]. Starting from this result, new 
methods have been developed, mainly based on techniques borrowed from steganalysis, 
such as Random Spectral Features [31][32] and speech/speaker recognition, by extracting 
information from the Fourier domain and its more sophisticated representation such as 
MFCCs and LFCCs. Other approaches have been also investigated, also working in the 
Fourier domain, but focusing on the estimation of the transfer function of the microphone, 
which is modelled as a linear time invariant system that distort the audio signal. 
1.3 Challenges for microphone fingerprinting  
Although most of the works declare promising microphone identification accuracies higher 
than 90%, their outcomes need to be further studied, since some issues and questions 
have to be addressed to adopt microphone fingerprinting in a real investigation workflow, 
in terms of: 
 Features. Some works claim that MFCCs based methods outperforms LFCCs ones, 
whereas in other works the opposite seems true. In some early works, Random 
Spectral Features seems to outperform MFCCs, whereas following works refer 
MFCCs as the most promising technique. Moreover, MFCCs are recognized to be 
suitable to describe speech content, due to its own capability of modelling human 
voice, and even to recognize the source device. However, they perform well also 
when applied to non-speech segments to identify a microphone: this aspect should 
be investigated deeper.    
 Experimental setup. As it often happens, a fair comparison of the different works 
is hard to establish due to the non-homogeneous experimental protocols employed 
to assess methods performance. However, the general trend is to reproduce the 
same sounds and to record it with different devices. In most of the cases, it is not 
explicitly mentioned if the records have been acquired at the same time (unpractical 
solution) or at different times. Sometimes different environments, as small or large 
office, streets or countryside, have been chosen. The most used test sample has 
been the TIMIT database [33], well known in the field of speaker/speech 
recognition. This choice is quite standard, but in principle it is not a constraint. 
Other samples were music sounds, or natural sounds acquired in streets, places 
and countryside. So, the effects of the environmental noise and of the type of sound 
are not carefully evaluated and discussed. 
 Benchmark dataset. Some standard speech databases are used, but this choice 
is motivated by the need of having the same input signals for each device. In terms 
of devices corpus, the maximum number of devices used for an assessment is 
around 20 devices. However, rarely such corpus is composed of devices from the 
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same model, except for [19]. This fact limits a comprehensive understanding about 
the capability of fingerprinting a specific single device. 
 Operating scenarios. The most studied scenario is the microphone identification 
in a closed-set setting, whereas microphone verification has been investigated few 
times. Other scenarios haven’t been taken into account yet, or just marginally, such 
as content-based retrieval and unsupervised clustering.   
Starting from these considerations, some open questions still remain, and we intend to 
answer in this and futures reports: 
1. Is MFCC the best feature to model audio recordings for microphone recognition? 
Can we improve or target this or other features in case of a true investigation 
scenario? 
2. What is the impact of the type of input signals? Does the performance change in 
function of the sound? Is it preferable using speech or not speech segments to 
model microphone response? Can different sounds bring to different results? 
3. Are these features able to reliably characterize a single source device, or only a 
particular device model or brand? 
4. How does the environment, in terms of both propagation and noise, impact on the 
performance? 
5. How do these features perform in more complex operating scenario such as retrieval 
and clustering, which are highly desired functionalities for Law Enforcement 
investigation? 
6. Is the performance of this kind of fingerprinting techniques comparable to the SPN 
in case of video recordings?  
7. Can we combine together to reach a more reliable device identification? 
The above unanswered questions will drive the main JRC research actions in the field. 
 
1.4 Outline of the following Chapters 
The next Chapters are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a technical insight about audio 
processing, and in particular about the method for microphone fingerprinting, is given. 
Then, in Chapter 3 the operational scenario considered in our analysis are described. The 
technical report carries on with an experimental evaluation of the method in Chapter 4. 
Finally, Chapter 5 conclude the report, providing recommendation and directions for further 
researches in the field.  
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2 Microphone fingerprinting 
In this Chapter we go through the technical details of the method we employed for 
microphone recognition from video sequences. The algorithm relies on the work in [26], 
where it has been used for audio tampering detection. Such an approach is based on blind 
channel magnitude estimation [28][29], wherein the term “channel” refers to the 
microphone frequency response in [25][27] and in our study, rather than the acoustic 
environment, as originally conceived. 
Starting from this brief forward, the recorded audio signal can be modelled in the time 
domain as follows: 
𝑥(𝑛) = 𝑠(𝑛) ∗ ℎ(𝑛) + 𝑣(𝑛) (1)                                                 
Where 𝑥(𝑛) is the recorded audio signal, 𝑠(𝑛) is the audio signal at the receiver (i.e 
microphone), ℎ(𝑛) is the impulse response of the microphone, 𝑣(𝑛) is a noise term 
introduced by the microphone and ∗ means the linear convolution. (1) can be expressed in 
the frequency domain by means of Short Term Fourier Transform (STFT) as: 
𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙) = 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)𝐻(𝑘, 𝑙) + 𝑉(𝑘, 𝑙) (2) 
for frequency 𝑘 and time frame 𝑙, where 𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙), 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙), 𝐻(𝑘, 𝑙) and 𝑉(𝑘, 𝑙) are sequences of 
complex numbers. Then, assuming that the frame length of the STFT is large compared to 
the impulsive response, we make the following approximation: 
 
𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙) ≈ 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)𝐻(𝑘) + 𝑉(𝑘, 𝑙) (3) 
Wherein the microphone response 𝐻(𝑘) is constant over the time, meaning that microphone 
response varies more slowly than the speech. Furthermore, assuming to be in a noiseless 
case, i.e.  𝑉(𝑘, 𝑙) = 0, and passing to the magnitude of complex number we obtain: 
|𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙)|2 ≈ |𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)|2|𝐻(𝑘)|2 (4) 
Then, passing to the logarithms: 
log|𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙)| ≈ log|𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)| + log|𝐻(𝑘)| . (5) 
Let’s suppose now to know the log-spectrum log|𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)| of the input signal, the microphone 
response could be estimated as: 
?̂?(𝑘) =
1
𝐿
∑ (𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙) − 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙))
𝐿
𝑙=1
(6) 
Where 𝐴 = log (|𝐴|), ?̂? is the estimate of 𝐴 and 𝐿 is the total number of time frames. 
In a forensic scenario, the original signal 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙) is unknown, but we can think to estimate 
?̂?(𝑘, 𝑙) from the recorded signal 𝑋(𝑘, 𝑙). In a nutshell, the core of the method relies on finding 
a good estimation of the original signal, because this will affect the accuracy of the channel 
estimated.  
To obtain an estimation of 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙), speaker recognition literature can help to cope with this 
problem. From now, we are focusing on speech as input signal 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙). Concerning that, a 
vast literature has been produced so far, starting from [34] wherein RASTA-filtered Mel-
Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (RASTA-MFCC) have been successfully used to model 
human voice for speaker (and speech) identification. Beyond that, it is worth to note that 
such a feature has shown to be robust (i.e. independent) to the distortion introduced by 
the microphone. In [28], it is shown that combining RASTA-MFCC and Gaussian Mixture 
Models (GMM) allows to obtain a good estimation of the original (called “clean” hereafter) 
speech. Moreover, in [35] the first 15 MFCCs are proved to be robust against MP3 
compression. Because the audio trace of a video recording is generally encoded in a 
compressed format, this property will extremely be useful to define the number of MFCCs 
to be employed in the proposed framework, as it will be explained later.    
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In the following subsections, details about the adopted approach for clean speech 
estimation are shown.     
 
2.1 Training a Gaussian Mixture Model for Clean Speech 
Gaussian Mixture Models have been extensively used in audio analysis [36] because they 
are quite general, so that they are able to model a vast variety of phenomena. Moreover, 
the employment of Expectation-Maximization Algorithm [37] for GMM training make this 
process quite efficient. In our case, the GMM consists of M classes of average clean speech 
log-spectra. 
In order to reliably estimate the microphone frequency response, a M-components GMM 
has to be trained. This is an off-line process that has to be performed just one time, once 
all the parameters of the system are fixed (for further details we refer to the experimental 
evaluation Chapter).  
Given a training set of clean speeches s(n), this is split into overlapping windowed frames 
and the STFT is applied to obtain 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙). Then, for each frame, a vector 𝒄𝑠(𝑙) =
[𝑐𝑠(1, 𝑙) 𝑐𝑠(2, 𝑙) … 𝑐𝑠(𝑁, 𝑙)] of N RASTA-MFCCs and the average log-spectrum 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙) are 
calculated. Furthermore, the mean of the log-spectrum is subtracted as 
?̃?(𝑘, 𝑙) =  𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙) −
1
𝐾
∑ 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙)
𝐾−1
𝑘=0
(7) 
Where 𝐾 defines the number of frequency points in the STFT domain. 
Once we have obtained RASTA-MFCC coefficients, they are used to train the GMM model, 
which is defined by the mean vector 𝜇𝑚, the covariance matrix Σ𝑚 (we assume diagonal 
covariance matrix) and the weights 𝜋𝑚 of each mixture. Then, the mixture probabilities 𝛾𝑙,𝑚 
are calculated as in [28]: 
𝛾𝑙,𝑚 =  
𝜋𝑚𝒩(𝒄𝑠(𝑙)|𝜇𝑚, Σ𝑚)
∑ 𝜋𝑗𝒩(𝒄𝑠(𝑙)|𝜇𝑗, Σ𝑗)
𝑀
𝑗=1
(8) 
Where 𝒩(𝒄𝑠(𝑙)|𝜇𝑚, Σ𝑚) denote the probability density function of a multivariate Gaussian 
distribution.  
Finally, we combine 𝛾𝑙,𝑚 and ?̃?(𝑘, 𝑙) to obtain a weighted short-term log-spectra over all the 
available training set frames and thus to have the set M average clean speech log-spectra, 
as: 
𝑆?̅?(𝑘) =
∑ 𝛾𝑙,𝑚?̃?(𝑘, 𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=1
∑ 𝛾𝑙,𝑚
𝐿
𝑙=1
(9) 
The average spectra of each component  𝑆?̅?(𝑘) and the parameters 𝜇𝑚 , Σ𝑚 and 𝜋𝑚 of the 
M-components GMM will be used to estimate the microphone response in the following part 
of the algorithm.  
 
2.2 Blind channel estimation 
The clean speech model is then used to estimate the microphone response. Again, The 
STFT analysis is applied to the observed audio signal 𝑥(𝑛), obtaining an N-dimensional 
feature vector of RASTA-MFCC coefficients 𝒄𝑥(𝑙) = [𝑐𝑥(1, 𝑙) 𝑐𝑥(2, 𝑙) … 𝑐𝑥(𝑁, 𝑙)] and the 
corresponding average log-spectrum ?̃?(𝑘, 𝑙) for each frame 𝑙. Also here, the mean of log-
spectrum is subtracted.  
Now, we are ready to estimate the clean speech log-spectrum ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑙) by using the observed 
feature vectors 𝒄𝑥(𝑙) and the M-components GMM parameters (𝜇𝑚, Σ𝑚, 𝜋𝑚  ) obtained during 
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the training phase, as described in Section 2.1. The probabilities 𝛾′
𝑙,𝑚
 given by 𝒄𝑥(𝑙) from 
the GMM model are calculated as in Eq. (8), for each Gaussian component. These 
probabilities are used to estimate the average of clean speech log-spectrum for each frame 
as a weighted sum of clean speech log-spectrum of each Gaussian component. In formula: 
?̂?(𝑘, 𝑙) =  ∑ 𝛾′
𝑙,𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑆?̅?(𝑘) (10) 
Finally, the microphone response is estimated assuming that 𝑆(𝑘, 𝑙) ≈  ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑙) and applying 
Eq. (6). 
As suggested in [26], the estimate ?̂?(𝑘) of the microphone response bring just a portion of 
all the information available within the test audio sequence 𝑥(𝑛). To maximize the available 
information, three feature vectors is computed as follows: feature (1) contains all the 
information available from the microphone response estimation. Feature (2) describes the 
correlation between the microphone response estimation and the original log-spectra of 
the input audios, while feature (3) describes the properties of the input audio files.  
Let’s estimate the average power of the input signal 𝑥(𝑛) as: 
?̂?(𝑘) =  
1
𝐿𝑥
∑ ?̃?(𝑘, 𝑙)
𝐿𝑥
𝑙=1
(11) 
We also define (𝑣)̅̅ ̅̅  as the average value of a generic vector 𝑣.  
The feature (1), namely 𝑓1, is defined as: 
𝑓1 = [ℎ1, ℎ1
′ , ℎ1
′′], (12)  
with ℎ1 = ?̂?(𝑘) + (?̂?)̅̅ ̅̅   
where 𝑣′ and  𝑣′′ denote the first and second discrete derivatives, respectively. 
The feature (2), namely 𝑓2, is defined as: 
𝑓2 = [ℎ2, ℎ2
′ , ℎ2
′′], (13) 
with ℎ2 = ?̂?(𝑘)./ ?̂?(𝑘) 
where the operation (𝑎)./(𝑏) perform right-array division by dividing each element of 𝑎 by 
the corresponding element of 𝑏.  
The feature (3), namely 𝑓3, is calculated as follows: 
𝑓3 = [‖ℎ3‖[0,1], ‖ℎ3
′ ‖[0,1], ‖|ℎ3|‖[0,1] ] (14) 
with ℎ3 =  ?̂?(𝑘) + (?̂?(𝑘))
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
where ‖(∙)‖[0,1] is a normalization faction defined as: 
‖(∙)‖[0,1] =  
(∙) − min(∙)
max(∙) − min(∙)
(15) 
and |𝑣| provides the absolutes value of the coordinates of a given vector 𝑣. 
 
Finally, all these features are concatenated in a unique feature vector, as 
𝑓 = [𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3] (16) 
that represents the microphone descriptive feature we are using in our study. 
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2.3 Matching strategies 
Given two fingerprints 𝒇𝑥1 and 𝒇𝑥2 extracted from two general audio signals 𝑥1(𝑛) and 𝑥2(𝑛), 
the Pearson’s correlation, also known as Normalized Cross-Correlation (NCC), is employed 
as similarity measure, which is defined as  
𝜌(𝒇𝑥1, 𝒇𝑥2) =  
(𝒇𝑥1 − ?̅?𝑥1) ∙ (𝒇𝑥2 − ?̅?𝑥2)
‖𝒇𝑥1 − ?̅?𝑥1‖ ∙ ‖𝒇𝑥2 − ?̅?𝑥2‖
(17) 
where the operators (∙)̅̅ ̅ and ‖(∙)‖ are the mean and the L2-norm of a vector, respectively. 
Note that 𝜌(𝒇𝑥1, 𝒇𝑥2) is bounded in [-1,1]. 
It is worth to note here that when such a measure is referred as a score, we use 𝜌(𝒇𝑥1, 𝒇𝑥2) 
as it is. When such a measure is referred a “distance” metrics, the measure is 1 −  𝜌(𝒇𝑥1, 𝒇𝑥2), 
in such a way to satisfy the conditions for distance in a metric space.  
 
2.4 Limitations and possible solutions 
Although the method we described in the previous Sections has been successfully 
employed in scenario close to those that are considered here, it brings some limitations in 
terms of both modelling and robustness.  
Here, we provide a list of the intrinsic limitations of the model. 
 Signal model. The method relies mainly on a clean speech estimation process. In 
this sense, the features (RASTA-MFCCs) chosen to accomplish this task are optimal 
when speech is present in the analysed recording. When the speech is not present, 
the performance is at least sub-optimal, and also difficult to predict in case in which 
other types of sound are present. Then, because microphone responses are 
designed to be flat as much as possible on the voice waveband, in order to limit 
voice distortion, the likelihood is that the portion of spectrum related to the voice 
is not the most discriminative part of the audio spectrum, whereas the non-linear 
parts (above and below the voice spectrum) might well bring more information. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no significant works are present in 
literature exploring such properties. 
 Training. All the methods encountered in literature, both the ones based on blind 
channel estimation and those based on pure machine learning techniques, use audio 
traces where only a single language is present, i.e. English, both for training and 
testing samples. In order to move towards a practical use of them, this aspect 
should be further addressed. In particular, an evaluation of the impact of the use 
of a model trained on a specific language, and then applied to recordings containing 
other languages, would be extremely relevant.  
 Absence of a reference signal. To the best of our knowledge, there’s no evidence 
that suggests to use some specific sounds instead of others in order to reliably 
generate a reference signal identifying a single device, in a way similar to that 
employed for SPN (namely, flat images). However, looking at how the method 
works, it is highly recommended to employ a noiseless speech recording, as long 
as possible, with a controlled level of reverberation. Further analysis on this topic 
will be conducted in the course of future JRC researches. 
In addition to that, other elements can make less reliable the estimation of the microphone 
response, in particular: 
 Recording duration. From the state of art, 5-6 seconds are believed to be enough 
to reach a reliable estimation of the microphone response. It is likely that the 
analysis of shorter recordings can bring to misleading results. Some studies in this 
sense would be useful to clearly state the limits in which a certain level of 
performance is guaranteed. 
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 Compression. Most of the video recordings containing audio tracks can be re-
compressed for efficient storing and transmission (e.g. upload on Youtube re-
compresses video, and the audio as well). Lossy compression in general, the most 
used one for videos and audios, degrades microphone response estimation.  
 Noise. Some noises can heavily affect the reliability of clean speech estimation. 
Some of them are the Additive White Gaussian Noise (that models thermic noise in 
electronic components), reverberation (that depends on the acoustic environment) 
and blowing in the microphone, that might be due to the wind or the speaker itself. 
Other types of environmental noises, such as car engines in the streets, trains in a 
train station just to name a few, might affect the overall performance.  
 Audio editing. Some audio editing techniques can be applied to tamper an audio 
trace of a video recording. For example, the voice of the author of a crime present 
in the video, might be disguised to don’t allow to go back to him/her. Other common 
editing processes are trimming and/or insertion of other video/audio track. 
Some of these elements are already analysed in literature, even though a most 
comprehensive and systematic analysis is recommended for future works. 
 
2.5 Between intelligence and prosecution 
Considering the results collected so far from the state of the art analysis as well as during 
preliminary experiments, it would be at present probably still premature to consider 
microphone fingerprinting matching as a digital evidence to be used for prosecution. 
However, microphone fingerprinting can provide already valuable indications during the 
investigation phase, which precedes the production of evidences in a criminal case, 
especially in data analysis and investigative hypothesis formulation. 
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3 Operational scenarios 
As we already did for Sensor Pattern Noise based camera fingerprinting [1], we defined 4 
operational scenarios for the usage of microphone fingerprinting, following the advices and 
feedbacks that Europol’s EC3 provided to us, attempting to more strongly link the 
techniques with the real needs of investigators. Although the approach described in the 
previous Chapter is quite general, so that in principle it can be applied to whatever audio 
recordings, we focus on a specific application: the audio tracks come from video recordings 
and the final aim is to identify/classify in function of the source device.   
The scenarios we considered are: 
1. Device classification/identification; 
2. Device verification; 
3. Content-based retrieval; 
4. Device clustering. 
Compared to the SPN, in this study we collapse device-based and the utterance-based 
(corresponding to the picture-based retrieval scenario for SPN) in the same content-based 
retrieval scenario. This choice is motivated by the fact that, at this stage of the work, we 
cannot define a best practice to extract reference signal for audio when the device is 
available to the investigators, as already conceived for SPN reference. In other words, 
without the possibility of having such a strategy, it does not really make sense at this stage 
to distinguish between the case of in which the device is available to the investigators 
(device-based retrieval) and the case in which the device is not available (content-based 
retrieval). We leave to future researches the opportunity of distinguishing between the two 
operational scenarios.  
3.1 Device classification/identification 
This scenario simulates the case in which the analyst wants to identify what device, in a 
given closed-set of devices, has taken a certain audio/video recording, and has direct 
access to those devices (i.e. analyst can use them to extract the reference signal). In a 
more formal way, the task is to assign a given recording A (an offending audio/video 
content) to the camera which produce it, by choosing among a set of N devices 𝔻 =
{𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑁}, known and available to the investigator.  
In detail, the procedure to perform this test is the following: 
 From a set of recordings that the investigator knows (or he/she can produce) to 
belong to the set of devices 𝔻, a reference fingerprint for each device is extracted 
as described in Chapter 2; 
 The fingerprint of the probe recording is extracted in the same way; 
 The probe fingerprinting is matched against all the reference fingerprints; 
 The resulting scores are ranked from the highest to the lowest value; 
 A is assigned to the device with the highest score. 
This scenario has two main constraints. The first is that the true device is supposed to be 
in the set 𝔻 of known devices. The second one, is that the investigator has access to all 
the devices, in order to produce some reference recordings, or at least, he/she has access 
to a set of recordings whose source device is known (e.g. from contextual information, 
investigative case etc.). 
Concerning the performance evaluation in terms of identification accuracy, Cumulative 
Matching Characteristics (CMC) curves, which measure the correct identification 
cumulative rate (or probability, using a frequentist approximation) of finding the correct 
match within a given number of ranks (from the 1st rank to the Nth rank). 
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Figure 1. Example of CMC curve 
 
In Figure 1 an example of Cumulative Matching Characteristics curves is shown.  
 
3.2 Device verification 
This scenario simulates the case in which the analyst wants to verify whether a given device 
has been used to take a given video recording, by analysing its audio trace, and has direct 
access to that device. In other words, the scenario is analogous to the task of one-vs-one 
(1-vs-1) comparison between a recordings and a device. The answer will be therefore 
binary (Yes/No). However, this scenario can involve more than one device. Here, the main 
difference with the previous scenario is that there’s no assumption about the presence of 
the source device within the set 𝔻 of analysed devices.  
Similar to the identification problem, it is highly advisable that the investigator can access 
to the devices used for testing, to produce reference fingerprints or at least be in possess 
of a set of recordings that he/she knows be taken from a given camera. 
In detail, the procedure to perform this test is the following: 
 Given a device belonging to 𝔻, a reference fingerprint is extracted as described in 
Chapter 2; 
 The fingerprint of the probe recording is extracted in the same way; 
 Probe fingerprinting is matched against the reference fingerprint of the device; 
 The score is compared to a decision threshold. If the score is above the threshold, 
the recording is verified to have been taken from that device, otherwise the test 
fails. 
The choice of the threshold is of primary importance because it has impact on the number 
of False Positives (FP, i.e. decision is Yes when the true answer is No) and False Negatives 
(FN, decision is NO whereas the true answer is Yes). To be independent from the threshold 
choice, the performance is evaluated by varying the threshold and evaluating the FP rate 
(FPR) and FN rate (FNR) for each threshold step. By plotting FPR against FNR we obtain 
the Receiver Operator Characteristics curve. An example is shown in Figure 2. Another 
useful representation is that shown in Figure 3, wherein both FPR and FNR are plot in the 
same graph in function of the threshold value. 
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Figure 2. Example of ROC curve 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of False Positive and False Negative curves 
 
 
It is worth to note that the final choice of the threshold can be done by applying different 
criteria. The most common one is the Equal Error Rate (ERR) criteria that means to choose 
the threshold for which the FPR is equal FNR. This criterion minimizes the overall error of 
the method. Other criteria can be to set a desired FPR or FNR, so that to retrieve the 
corresponding threshold and make the decision. 
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3.3 Content-based retrieval 
This scenario simulates the case when the analyst wants to retrieve all the audio/video 
recordings, in a given database, that have been captured with a certain device. Contrary 
to the scenarios conceived for SPN applications, here we don’t make distinction if the device 
is available or not to the investigator, as already explained in the introduction of this 
Chapter. 
In detail, the procedure to perform this test is the following: 
 Compare a reference fingerprint (provided by one or more recoding from the same 
camera) with those extracted from all audio/video in the database; 
 Rank the resulting scores; 
 Probe fingerprinting is matched against the reference fingerprint of the device; 
 The score is compared to a decision threshold. 
Performance can be measured in terms of ROC curve (described in the verification 
scenario), and in terms Precision-Recall curve, as shown in Figure 4. Precision is defined 
in as the expected fraction of relevant (true matches) audios contained in the retrieved 
list; recall is instead defined as the expected fraction of all true matches in the data base 
that has been retrieved in the list. Both error measures vary with respect to the threshold; 
therefore, similarly to the ROC, a curve can be plotted. If a scalar performance index is 
needed, given a decision threshold, 𝐹1 score can be adopted; it is defined as the harmonic 
mean of Precision and Recall. In formula: 
𝐹1 = 2 ∙
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
𝐹1 score values close to one mean high retrieval performance, while value close to zero 
means poor performance. 
Figure 4. Example of Precision-Recall curve. 
 
3.4 Clustering  
This scenario represents the case where an investigator has a set of video recordings, 
collected from an unknown number of different devices, personal computers or web 
servers, to give just some examples, and wants to classify or group them into clusters with 
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respect to the source device. It represents the most challenging operational scenario, 
because no (or limited) a-priori information is available to investigators. However, it is 
useful in a variety of practical cases, e.g., to discover how many devices have been used 
to produce a certain series of unlawful videos or to discover links between different criminal 
cases (same devices used across different cases), so that to drive law enforcers’ activities 
along new investigation lines. 
A second aspect is that clustering algorithms usually perform better, and more efficiently, 
when at least the number of cameras is known; the information that this number falls 
within a defined range can be also useful to limit errors. Unfortunately, these assumptions 
do not hold in the operational scenario at hand. Still, they can remain valid in certain 
situations, e.g., when a hard-drive containing videos has been seized, and investigators 
already known that such videos come from a definite number of devices. 
Stated that this scenario deserves a more thorough investment than the others, we leave 
its analysis, development and implementation to a dedicated research action of the AVICAO 
project. However, we have already considered some “probabilistic” clustering approach, 
such as Gaussian Mixture Model based clustering. This choice is motivated by the fact that 
in addition to a correct classification of data (which still remains the primary final goal, 
even though hard to be achieved always and everywhere), the degree of reliability (i.e. 
the probability) of a given device of belonging to a cluster is certainly relevant from the 
investigators’ point of view. This approach, in practice, may well help users to select the 
most trustworthy set of data, from which they can start their investigation on more solid 
and reliable data.  
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4 Feasibility study and experimental evaluation 
In this Chapter we evaluate the feasibility of the adoption of microphone fingerprinting for 
video recordings classification/verification/retrieval in all operational scenarios, except for 
the clustering, as introduced in the previous Chapter. 
Concerning the general conditions of the tests, we will focus on video recordings generated 
by smartphones, for the following reasons: 
1. Smartphones are a continuously growing phenomenon nowadays, and an increasing 
portion of contents, including illegal ones, is produced by using these devices; 
2. The majority of multimedia contents shared on-line are produced by smartphones. 
The Chapter carries on as follows. The benchmark data set is described in Section 4.1, the 
experimental protocols in Section 4.2, implementation details are also provided in Section 
4.3 and the results are shown in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 wraps around this Chapter 
with discussions and results analysis.  
  
4.1 Smartphones benchmark data set 
In order to reproduce the operational scenario adopted, a benchmark dataset of video 
containing audio traces has been produced. The dataset is composed of the raw data (i.e. 
video recordings) and the related ground-truth information (i.e. a device identifier). Forty-
two smartphones, comprising different brands and models, have been collected. It is worth 
to note that for some brand/models, more than one device is present in order to evaluate 
if the method is able to discriminate between two different devices of the same 
brand/model. In Table 1 the complete list of devices is shown. 
 
Table 1. List of devices 
 MICROPHONE CAMERA 
ID 
DEVICE 
Brand Model Operating 
System 
Sampling 
Rate 
Audio 
Compression 
Native 
Resolution 
 Video 
Resolution 
Video 
Compression  
1 Apple Iphone 4 IOS 44100 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592 x 
1936 
1280x720 H264 - MPEG4 
2 Apple Iphone 4 IOS 44100 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592 x 
1936 
1280x720 H264 - MPEG4 
3 Apple Iphone 6 IOS 44100 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592 x 
1936 
1280x720 H264 - MPEG4 
4 HTC One X Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3264x1840 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
5 HTC One X Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3264x1840 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
6 HTC One X Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3264x1840 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
7 Sony Experia S Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 4000x2250 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
8 Sony Experia S Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 4000x2250 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
9 Sony Experia S Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 4000x2250 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
10 Samsung Galaxy Nexus I92 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592x1944 1280x738 H264 - MPEG4 
11 Samsung Galaxy Nexus I92 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592x1944 1280x738 H264 - MPEG4 
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12 Samsung Galaxy Nexus S android 32000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 720x480 H264 - MPEG4 
13 Nokia Lumia 735 Microsoft 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3072x1728 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
14 Nokia Lumia 735 Microsoft 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3072x1728 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
15 Nokia Lumia 735 Microsoft 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 3072x1728 1920x1080 H264 - MPEG4 
16 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
17 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
18 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
19 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
20 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
21 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
22 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
23 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
24 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
25 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
26 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
27 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
28 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
29 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
30 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
31 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
32 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
33 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
34 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
35 Samsung ACE GT-S5830 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 640x480 MPEG-4 
36 Samsung Galaxy S6 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 5312x2988 3840x2160 H264 - MPEG4 
37 Hero 4 Gopro GNU Linux 48000 Hz AAC 4000x3000 3480x2160 H263 - MPEG  
38 HTC ONE m9 Android 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 5376x3024 3840x2160 H264 - MPEG4 
39 BlackBerry Torch 9800 BlackBerry 
OS 
32000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2592x1944 640x480 MPEG4 
40 BlackBerry 9900 Qwerty BlackBerry 
OS 
48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 1280x720 H264 - MPEG4 
41 BlackBerry 9900 Qwerty BlackBerry 
OS 
48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 2560x1920 1280x720 H264 - MPEG4 
42 Nokia Lumia 435 Microsoft 48000 Hz MPEG - AAC 1600x1200 880x448 H264 - MPEG4 
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By using each of the aforementioned devices, two types of data set are acquired in order 
to evaluate different aspects of the blind channel estimation-based method. 
Controlled set 
The first data set is acquired with the following protocol: 
 A suitable video sequence is reproduced by means of a LCD screen and 
loudspeakers for audio, and recaptured by means of the all the smartphones; 
 The smartphones are placed always in the same positions with respect both the 
room walls and the audio/visual sources; 
 A video sequence, whose duration is at least 3 minutes, is recaptured and then 
trimmed in subsequence of 6 seconds, for each device; 
 The source video sequence is composed of a set of video recordings from VIDTimit 
Audio-Video dataset [38][39]. Although the dataset was conceived for speaker and 
speech recognition from audio/visual features, it was suitable also as dataset for 
our purposes. This is composed of small sentences (~3 seconds each) in English, 
from people of different ages, with different accent and balanced in gender. We 
randomly select a subset of sentences, taking care of having no repetitions and a 
balance in gender speakers, to be concatenated in the source video. 
The aim of this first set of data is: 
 To verify that the method effectively estimates the microphone response instead of 
the environment; 
 To reduce as much as possible undesired noises in the recordings, that could have 
made the results analysis more difficult; 
 To make an analysis on a wider typology of speeches, in term of age, accent, 
gender, which is difficult to reach in practice with live recordings. 
Live recordings  
The second dataset is acquired with the following protocol: 
 Two video recordings of at least two minutes with at least one person speaking are 
recorded indoor (large offices) and outdoor, for each device. Two male and one 
female voices are randomly present in the recordings, speaking English; 
 Two video recordings of at least 1 minutes are recorded with no speech are acquired 
indoor and outdoor, for each device, so that the audio traces contain only 
environmental sounds; 
 The recordings are trimmed in sequences of duration 6 seconds.  
The aim of this second set of data is to simulates real recordings, wherein speech or simply 
environmental noise might occur.  
  
4.2 Experimental protocols 
Different experimental protocols have been defined for each operational scenario defined 
in Chapter 3. Such protocols are described in the following. Commonly to all protocols, the 
audio tracks are extracted from each 6s recordings by using FFMPEG1 in un uncompressed 
audio format (wav.). In case of stereo recordings, wherein two audio traces are present 
for a single video sequence, we considered only the left one by convention. In this way, 
we are still general, and we analysed the worst (and likely the most frequent) case (i.e. 
one audio trace is present). 
                                           
1 https://www.ffmpeg.org/ 
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Finally, the same protocols are applied to both controlled and live recordings datasets. 
 
4.2.1 Device identification/classification 
To assess the performance in this scenario, a template for each device is generated by: 
1. Extracting the audio fingerprint for each recoding of 6 seconds; 
2. For each device, 10 fingerprints are randomly selected to build a template for the 
related device; 
3. The remaining data are used as probe recordings; 
4. Each probe recording is matched against all the reference fingerprint of each device. 
Devices are finally ranked according to the obtained similarity measure; 
5. A CMC curve is computed to summarize the performance.  
The process is repeated 100 times, selecting a randomly the data used to build the 
reference fingerprint. This approach is known in Machine Learning field as cross validation. 
 
4.2.2 Device verification 
Similar to the device identification problem, we evaluate the performance in this 
operational scenario by: 
1. Extracting the audio fingerprint for each recoding of 6 seconds; 
2. For each device, 10 fingerprints are randomly selected to build a template for the 
related device; 
3. The remaining data are used as probe recordings; 
4. Each probe recording is matched against all the reference fingerprint of each device; 
5. The number of false positive and false negative are counted, by varying a threshold 
in the range [-1,1]; 
6. Two curves are finally obtained: 
o FPR-FNR graph is obtained by plotting the False Positive Rate and the False 
Negative Rate in the same graph, in function of the threshold. The advantage 
of using this graph is that keep information about the threshold, allowing to 
decide the threshold value in function of the desired error; 
o ROC curve, obtained by plotting FNR against FPR, allows to easy compare 
the performance of two methods applied to the same dataset; 
Again, the procedure is repeated 100 times to perform cross-validation. 
 
4.2.3 Content-based retrieval 
Also in this case, to assess the performance in this scenario, a template for each device is 
generated by: 
1. Extracting the audio fingerprint for each recoding; 
2. Selecting randomly 10 fingerprints for each device and averaging them; 
3. The remaining data are used as query recordings; 
4. For each query recording, a set of ranked devices is provided; 
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5. Precision and Recall curve and 𝐹1 score are computed to summarize the 
performance;  
The process is repeated 100 times for cross validation. 
 
4.3 Implementation details 
MATLAB2 has been used to implement the method described in Chapter 2. MATLAB 
functions such as audioread and audioinfo are used to read raw data file and file metadata, 
respectively. Then, PLP and RASTA-MFCC in MATLAB toolbox [40] is used for spectral 
analysis and MFCCs extraction. Then, MATLAB Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox 
function fitgmdist is used to train the Gaussian Mixture Model, while posterior function is 
used to get the probabilities given a set of observed RASTA-MFCC coefficient and trained 
Gaussian Mixture Model. 
In order to train the GMM model, the VIDTimit Audio-Video dataset has been used. In 
particular, has been used all the recordings that has not been used to generate the source 
video for the controlled dataset. The same model has been used also for the live recordings 
dataset.  
Hereafter we list the several parameters that have been set, both for training and testing, 
to make the experimental evaluation and the concerning motivations. 
In the off-line training process, we set: 
 Sampling rate: 32000 Hz; 
 Number of FFT points: 1024; 
 Windows time: 25 milliseconds; 
 Step time: 120 milliseconds; 
 Windows: Hanning; 
 Number of Gaussian components: 64; 
 Number of RASTA-MFCC coefficients: 13; 
The choice of using a sampling rate of 32 kHz is due to the fact that this is the minimum 
frequency at which an audio is sampled in the overwhelming majority of smartphones. The 
choice of 64 components for the GMM has been suggested by literature, whereas the choice 
of the first 13 RASTA-MFCC is suggested as a trade of between computational complexity 
and robustness against compression [35], because compression is always present in case 
of audio extracted from video recording. 
The other parameters are chosen by comparing best practises from the state of art.  
In addition to these internal parameters, we set two parameters in our experiments: 
 Recording durations: 6 seconds 
 Reference recording durations: 60 seconds 
The recording duration has been decided as a trade-off between accuracy (most of the 
works in literature assume that such a duration is sufficient for reliably estimating the 
channel response) and number of samples for each experiment.  
Finally, the choice of the reference duration is quite arbitrary, but reasonable considering 
different factors, such as device storage capabilities and common usage. 
                                           
2 © 1994-2017 The MathWorks, Inc. 
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Further studies obtained by varying such parameters are left for future activities, once this 
technology will be quite mature to be used in real investigations, in order to clearly state 
the boundaries in which this technique can be validly used. 
 
4.4 Results 
Hereafter we present the results of the experimental evaluation. For each operational 
scenario, we analysed the performance of the method for each data set, controlled and live 
recordings ones, separately. An overall comparison is made in Section 4.5. 
 
4.4.1 Device classification/identification 
First, we analysed the performance of device classification/identification. The experiments 
are repeated 100 times (i.e. runs) by random sampling 10 sequences of 6 seconds to build 
the template of each microphone. Then, the scores are obtained by calculating NCC 
between the remaining recordings used as probe data, and then ordered in order to obtain 
a CMC curve for each run. To show 100 CMC curves in a single graph, we use boxplot 
representation, which allows to graphically represent the distribution of the probabilities of 
identifications within the k-th rank, for each considered rank.  On each box, the central red 
mark indicates the median, and the bottom and top edges of the box indicate the 25th and 
75th percentiles, respectively. The whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not 
considered outliers, and the outliers are plotted individually using the red '+' symbol. 
In Figure 5 the results on the controlled dataset are shown, whereas in Figure 6 the 
results are related to the live recordings dataset. 
  
Figure 5. Boxplots of CMC curves obtained by testing on the controlled dataset. 
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Figure 6. Boxplots of CMC curves obtained by testing on the live recordings dataset. 
 
In order to easily compare the two results, and to better explain the meaning of boxplot 
representation, we analysed the probability of identification at 3th rank. Results are 
compared in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of identification performance at 3th rank between the controlled and live 
recordings datasets. 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Controlled 0.73212 0.75369 0.79455 
Live recordings 0.67540 0.69841 0.73294 
 
Two main considerations need to be made. First, the method performs better on the 
controlled dataset compared to the live recordings dataset. This can be explained by the 
fact that in the second set of data there are sequence wherein no speech is present, whilst 
in first one a frame of speech is always present. This aspect will be addressed in Section 
4.5. Regarding the environment impact, this last element is out of the scope of this 
analysis, and will be addressed in future works.  
Second, as it can be easily verified for the other ranks, the probability of identification 
fluctuates in a small range of values (±4% of the median values) in the same way for both 
datasets, leading to the conclusion that the method is quite independent from the audio 
content in terms of speaker characteristics.   
 
4.4.2  Device verification 
The same cross-validation approach has been employed for 1-vs-1 device verification, by 
random sampling 10 sequences to build a template for each devices and the remaining 
data as probes. The process is then repeated 100 times as before. Hereafter we don’t use 
boxplot as done for CMC curves, but we follow a different procedure in order to make our 
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data analysis simpler. First, we evaluate the distribution of the ERR, meant as scalar 
performance index, over all experiments. Then, we show the FPR-FNR and ROC curves in 
the median case, for both the datasets. 
 
Figure 7. Distributions of EERs for controlled (a) and live recordings (b) datasets. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
The distributions of EERs for both datasets are shown in Figure 7. As immediately clear 
from the comparison of the histograms, the method works a little better on the controlled 
dataset (a), rather than on the live recordings (b) one. The motivations of this behaviour 
can be borrowed from the previous analysis. In (a) we observe a fluctuation with respect 
to the median value (14.05% of EER) of ±4.4%, while in (b) we observe a variation with 
the respect to the median value (15.82% of EER) of ±8.4%. 
Finally, the FPR-FNR curves and the ROC curve are shown in the median case. The choice 
of the median case rather than the mean case is due to two considerations. The median is 
an approximation of the mean for symmetric distribution more robust to outliers 
(extremely favourable/unfavourable cases) than sample mean and, at the same time, it 
allows us to directly go back from the EER score to the related curves.  
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Figure 8. False Positive and False Negative Ratios curves are presented in (a). In (b) the ROC 
curve. The curves are obtained using the controlled dataset. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 9. False Positive and False Negative Ratios curves are presented in (a). In (b) the ROC 
curve. The curves are obtained using the live recordings dataset. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the performance in case of microphone verification for both 
datasets. It is worth to note here that in both cases the optimal threshold to minimize the 
total error according the EER criteria, is quite high (i.e. more than 0.995 against a 
maximum NCC value of 1). This behaviour suggests that, even though the method is 
sufficiently able to correctly classify the audio records, a considerable number of features 
coming from different devices shows a high correlation. This can be explained by 
considering the composition of the device set, wherein a great percentage of them are 
equal in terms of model/manufacturers.  
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4.4.3 Content-based retrieval 
An approach similar to that used in the previous scenario is adopted for content-based 
retrieval. 𝐹1 score is employed as scalar performance index to compare 100 experiment 
runs. This score is obtained by selecting the decision threshold in such a way that the 
classification error is minimized (i.e. to maximize 𝐹1 score), independently for each run. 
Then, we plot the Precision-Recall curve for the median case. 
 
Figure 10. Distributions of 𝐹1 scores for controlled (a) and live recordings (b) datasets. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
The distributions of 𝐹1 scores for both datasets are shown in Figure 10. As clear from the 
comparison of the histograms, also in this last scenario the method works slightly better 
on the controlled dataset (a), rather than on the live recordings (b) one. In (a) we observe 
a fluctuation with respect to the median value (0.4158 of 𝐹1 score) of ±5.6%, while in (b) 
we observe a variation with the respect to the median value (0.3208 of 𝐹1 score) of ±7.0%. 
 
Figure 11. Precision-Recall curves in the median case. The performance is evaluated using the 
controlled (a) and live recordings (b) datasets. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Furthermore, Figure 11 show the performance in case of content-based retrieval for both 
datasets, respectively controlled (a) and live recordings (b). The main conclusion is that 
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by fixing a threshold in such a way to get a high recall, the precision decrease dramatically. 
This means that a considerable number of false positive are retrieved by querying a 
hypothetic audio/video database.  
 
 
4.5 Preliminary results and discussion 
The results shown in the previous subsections give us an overall picture about the capability 
of the method concerning the microphone identification. The use of the controlled dataset 
allows to evaluate algorithm outcomes by adding a good variability of the input signal in 
terms of gender, age and accent of the speakers and contents of speech (i.e. sentences). 
The limited fluctuations of the results tell us that the method is quite speech content 
independent, at least in the restricted condition in which GMM training and testing is applied 
to the same language (i.e. English in our case). Moreover, the fact that the controlled 
dataset is acquired under exactly the same sound propagation condition, confirm us that 
the method is able to fingerprint the microphone as matter of fact.  
The second dataset, namely live recordings, aims to add two other features to be explored: 
the first one is the variability of environments (indoor and outdoor), while the second one 
is the presence, or absence, of speech in the recorded audio. Our analysis is focused mainly 
on the second aspect, that is how the absence of speech impacts the performance, while 
the first aspect is left to future activities due to the complexity of the topic. 
To understand how absence of speech signal impacts the performance, we make a further 
analysis by respecting the following steps: 
 Recordings are split in non-speech and speech recordings; 
 Two device templates are built by using either speech or non-speech sequences, 
independently; 
 The results are evaluated on the probe sequences, divided in speech and non-
speech data. 
Hereafter the results for device classification/identification, verification and retrieval. 
4.5.1 Device classification/identification 
As scalar performance index we employ the probability of device identification at 3th rank. 
We evaluate such value for 100 experiments runs, and we show, for sake of shortness, the 
median value.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of outcomes for device identification in presence/absence of speech. 
Performance are shown as median value of probability of identification at rank 3th, over 100 of 
experiment runs. 
 Probes 
Speech Non-speech 
T
e
m
p
la
te
s
 Speech 77.91% 61.04% 
Non-speech 58.94% 75.75% 
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Compared to the overall performance (i.e. 69.84% of probability of identification at rank 
3th), it is clear that the absence of speech affects heavily the performance. Moreover, 
because the method shows close performance in case of speech-to-speech and non-speech 
to non-speech matching (i.e. 77.91% and 75.75% respectively), we can conclude that the 
channel estimation of our method is biased by the presence/absence of speech. In other 
words, the estimated channel response has different shapes whenever speech is absent. 
This is further confirmed by the fact that in the other cases, the performance dropped 
significantly.  
4.5.2 Device verification 
As scalar performance index we use the Equal Error Rate. We evaluate it for 100 
experiments and we show the median value.  
 
Table 4. Comparison of outcomes for device verification in presence/absence of speech. 
Performance are shown as median value of Equal Error Rate, over 100 experiment runs. 
 Probes 
Speech Non-speech 
T
e
m
p
la
te
s
 Speech 11.55% 23.18% 
Non-speech 21.77% 14.53% 
 
As already observed for device classification-identification scenario, the absence of speech 
affects the performance, which reaches its maximum when speech sequences are used to 
build a microphone template and probe audio sequences contain speech as well. 
4.5.3 Content-based Retrieval 
As scalar performance index we use the 𝐹1 score. We evaluate it for 100 experiments and 
we show the median value.  
 
Table 5. Comparison of outcomes for content-based retrieval in presence/absence of speech. 
Performance are evaluated as median value of 𝐹1 score, over 100 experiment runs. 
 Probes 
Speech Non-speech 
T
e
m
p
la
te
s
 Speech 42.12% 23.83% 
Non-speech 24.18% 35.85% 
 
The previous results are confirmed also in this last scenario. The presence of speech in 
both query and probe data represents the best case scenario. 
Finally, it is worth to note that if we limit our analysis to the data of live recordings dataset 
which contain speech, they generally show a higher performance (77.91% against 75.36% 
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for device identification, 11.55% against 15% for camera verification, 42.12% against 
41.58% for content-based retrieval) than the results obtained from the analysis of 
controlled dataset. This is unexpected results, indeed. Furthermore, looking closer at the 
results, the shape of the ROC curve in Figure 8 suggest us that something weird is 
happening, especially in the region of high False Positive Rate. It seems that even if the 
threshold value is low, the system is not able to correctly classify some of the genuine 
(true positive) scores. So, we perform a manual analysis of the controlled dataset and we 
found out that an audio trace has been badly recorded by its source device, so that most 
of the audio quality is compromised (almost 3% of overall data). This explain such 
surprising results, and the particular shape of the ROC curve on the controlled dataset 
compared to the one obtained by using the live recordings one. However, this accidental 
fact gave us the opportunity to come up with the idea that a preliminary fast data filtering, 
based on data quality/integrity, can be extremely useful in real investigation to limit 
processing to the most reliable data, especially in case of huge amount of data.     
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5 Conclusions 
The aim of this technical report, produced under the framework of the AVICAO institutional 
project, was to provide preliminary detailed results of the on-going research activity 
conducted by the DG-JRC on microphone fingerprinting as a tool for fighting against Child 
Abuse on-line, and to present subsequent R&D steps the project team will accomplish in a 
second phase. Briefly, we summarized the achieved results in the following: 
 A wide and deep study of the state of art has been made as starting point for the 
present and future activities; 
 A method based on blind microphone response estimation has been used for device 
fingerprinting; 
 A set of operational scenarios have been introduced according to investigators 
needs; 
 The performance of the method has been assessed in each operational scenario; 
 Two benchmark dataset of video recordings has been acquired to validate the 
method; 
 A critical analysis of the results has been made in order to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the method and, at the same time, to define the limit of applicability 
of the method, so that to drive future activities in the field. 
 A first insight concerning unsupervised data clustering is provided, and the related 
activities are currently going on. 
5.1 Results and recommendations 
The experimental evaluation carried out in Chapter 4 demonstrated the feasibility of 
microphone fingerprinting for video recordings. Moreover, the strength and the limitations 
of the actual method are presented. The method shows promising results in case of device 
identification/classification and verification scenarios, especially under the assumption that 
speech is present in a prominent part of the analysed audio recording. Content-based 
device retrieval is more challenging with respect the other scenarios, and a step further 
has to be accomplished to make the method usable in an investigation process. A rigorous 
procedure to have a reliable fingerprint estimation needs to be defined, in order to improve 
results in device identification and verification scenario, and so that to explore the method 
capabilities in the device-based retrieval scenario not explored yet. 
Future activities concerning unsupervised clustering are recommended to accomplish the 
latest operational scenario.    
 
5.2 Usage in investigation 
This first phase of this research has demonstrated that microphone fingerprinting can be a 
valuable source of information during the investigation phase, i.e., the step during which 
multiple hypotheses are formulated and validated. Supporting the digital forensics principle 
to not rely on a single element during investigations, microphone fingerprinting could be 
used with SPN to reach enhanced performance in case of video analysis. Moreover, it can 
be considered as a new and determinant tool that investigators will use for narrowing the 
set of suspect identities. 
 
5.3 From laboratory to field data set 
The results presented in Chapter 4 are a good indication of the expected performance on 
a real situation. However, one must not neglect the fact that tests have been conducted 
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with laboratory data, i.e., videos/audios not coming from real investigation cases. Tests 
conducted on real data would provide a better estimation of performance, and valuable 
indications on weak aspects of the algorithm and, consequently, on what improvements 
need to be realised in future. We’ll recall this aspect in Section 5.4. 
 
5.4 Future works 
Based on the results we obtained and discussed in this technical report, future research 
and development activities should focus on the following aspects: 
 Enhance the current baseline method in order to obtain more accurate results at feature 
level; 
 Explore other types of frequencies from the signal (e.g. ultrasound response) and 
use/combine them with the actual method, which is mainly based on voice; 
 Define a standard procedure to obtain a good microphone response estimation; this 
aspect is expected to improve the performance in all the operational scenario where 
the device is supposed to be available to the analyst; 
 Explore the possibility to use other training models, such as Deep Learning based 
techniques; 
 Evaluate the impact of training data, by using different languages, or speaker with 
different ages to demonstrate the portability of such an approach. This second aspect 
is particularly relevant in case of Child Abuse on-line; 
 Carry on tests on real world data; They can be borrowed from terrorism propaganda 
videos, or from Child Sex Abuse on-line cases. In both case, due to the legally restricted 
access to such sensible material, a convergence with the EVTECH-CSA project is 
desirable;  
 Robustness tests in terms of time duration, compression, sound propagation and noise 
are strongly requested in order to state usage limits of the method on real data; 
 Tackle with unsupervised clustering, with particular focus on “soft” (i.e. “probabilistic”) 
strategies; 
 Development of a prototype that EC3 law enforcers can use to evaluate the approach 
on the field; 
 Integration of the microphone-based fingerprinting techniques with other approaches, 
such as Sensor Pattern Noise, following a multimodal, or multi-clue, approach.  
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EC3   European Cyber Crime Centre 
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SPN   Sensor Pattern Noise 
MFCCs   Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
PCA    Principal Components Analysis 
LFCCs   Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
GMMs   Gaussian Mixture Models 
UBM    Universal Background Model 
SVM    Support Vector Machine 
PNCCs   Power-Normalized Cepstral Coefficients 
VQ    Vector Quantization 
SVD    Singular Value Decomposition 
NN    Neural Network 
PSD    Power Spectral Density 
STFT    Short Term Fourier Transform 
RASTA   RelAtive Spectral TrAnsofrm 
PLP    Perceptual Liner Prediction 
MPEG    Moving Picture Experts Group 
MP3    Moving Picture Expert Group-1/2 Audio Layer 3 
NCC    Normalized Cross-Correlation 
DFT   Discrete Fourier Transform 
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SVM   Support Vector Machine 
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FPR   False Positive Rate 
FNR   False Negative Rate 
TPR   True Positive Rate 
TNR   True Negative Rate 
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